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The Importance of Cost and Effectiveness for
Attitudes towards Lifesaving Interventions*
Joakim Ramsberg & Lennart Sjbberg**
Introduction
Several studies have reported large disparities in the cost per life
saved for different lifesaving interventions. Such studies have been
conducted in the U.S., 1  the U.K., 2  Japan
3  in Sweden. 4
Typically, results indicate that some interventions have benefits that
outweigh the costs, i.e., a cost per life saved at or below zero, whereas
others incur a cost per life saved in the range of hundreds of thousands
or even hundreds of millions of dollars.
Our definition of a lifesaving intervention resembles that of Tengs
et al.5 A lifesaving intervention is defined as any measure directed
* We thank Magnus Johannesson, John D. Graham and three anonymous referees
for helpful comments. Any remaining errors are of course due to the authors.
** Mr. Ramsberg, M.Sc., is a Ph.D. candidate in Economics, Stockholm School of
Economics and Visiting Scholar, Harvard Center for Risk Analysis (1997-98),
Harvard School of Public Health. Email: jramsber@hsps.harvard.edu.
Dr. Sj6berg is a Professor of Economic Psychology, Stockholm School of
Economics, and Director of its Center for Risk Research.
1 John D. Graham, et al., Evaluating the Cost-Effectiveness of Clinical Public
Health Measures, 19 Ann. Rev. Pub. Health 125 (1998); Tammy 0. Tengs, et al.,
Five-hundred Life-saving Interventions and Their Cost-effectiveness, 15 Risk Anal.
369 (1995); Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Oregon's Medicaid Ranking and Cost-
effectiveness: Is There Relationship? 16 Med. Decision Making 99 (1996); John F.
Ahearne, Integrating Risk Analysis Into Public Policymaking, 35 Environment 16
(1993); John F. Morrall, A Review of the Record, Regulation 25, Nov/Dec 1986;
Bernard L. Cohen, Societys Valuation of Life Saving in Radiation Protection and
Other Contexts, 38 Health Physics 33 (1980).
2 Barbara A. Soby, David J. Ball, Dawn P. Ives, Safety Investment and the Value
of Life and Injury, 13 RiskAnal. 365 (1993).
3 Atsuo Kishimoto, A Comparative Analysis of Cost-effectiveness of Risk
Reduction Policies in Japan, 8 Japan. J. Risk Anal. 165-(1997).
4 Joakim Ramsberg & Lennart Sjbberg, The Cost-effectiveness of Lifesaving
Interventions in Sweden, 17 RiskAnal. 467 (1997); Lennart Sj5berg, Totta Ogander,
At RMidda Liv - Kostnader och Effekter (1994); Bengt Hellqvist et al., Viirdering
av Risken fdr Personskador: En Jmfldrande Studie av Implicita och Explicita
Viirden, Ekonomiska Studier 10 (1982).
5 Tengs, supra note 1, at 369.
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towards changing the behavior and/or technology of individuals or
organizations, where reducing the probability of premature death in a
population is a primary goal or an effect of the intervention.
In a seminal article, Starr6 concluded that divergent investments
in risk reduction are roughly at a societal optimum. According to this
view, society has arrived at this optimum by a trial-and-error process, in
which people's preoccupation with the qualitative aspects of risk is
reflected. However, as Graham and Vaupel 7 and Cropper and
Subramanian 8 note, it is in no way obvious that current disparities in
cost per life saved reflect public preferences.
Starr's conclusion has been debated at great length, and the cost per
life saved of interventions have been suggested to vary for several other
reasons. Brooks et al. 9 suggest that an intervention implementation
can be driven by regulatory compliance issues, influential advocates
associated with the project, an affordable budget, or politically visible
risk addressed by the intervention. Cropper and Subramanian 10 argue
that the manner in which the programs are funded can explain many of
the differences. Although Graham1 1 concludes that society may be
concerned with values other than economic efficiency, he concedes that
there might be serious imperfections in the political decision making
process, leading to perverse variations in lifesaving investments. Graham
hypothesizes that the political process devotes more attention to risks
where the target population is politically organized, the costs of
regulation are less visible, and the regulatory agency is subject to co-
optation by the regulatee.
A few have attempted to study public preferences with respect to
acceptable variation in the cost per life saved. Savage 12 found that
6 Chauncey Starr, Social Benefit Versus Technological Risk, 165 Science 1232
(1969).
7 John D. Graham & James Vaupel, The Value of Life: What Difference Does It
Make? 1 RiskAnal. 89 (1981).
8 Maureen Cropper, Uma Subramanian, Public Choices Between Life-saving
Programs: How Important Are Lives Saved? Policy Research Working Paper No.
1497 (1995).
9 D. G. Brooks, et al., An Approach to Prioritizing Risk-Reducing Projects, in Int'l
Process Safety Managment Conference and Workshop (1993).
10 Cropper, supra note 8.
11 John Graham, Some Explanations for Disparities in Lifesaving Investments, 1
Policy Studies Rev. 692 (1982).
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mean willingness to pay to reduce four different risks varied by a factor
of three and that the variation was associated with the psychometric risk
attributes dread and unknown. 13 Mendeloff and Kaplan,1 4 and
Cropper and Subramanian 1 5 have both examined the issue of
acceptable variation in cost per life saved. The results in both of the
latter studies indicate that the median respondent supports a variation
factor of two or three in certain circumstances. In other words, a more
publicly preferred program could be a third less effective at saving lives
saved than a less preferred program and still be chosen in a pair-wise
comparison. 16 A majority of the respondents however, were not
willing to trade lives for qualitative characteristics beyond that point.
Thus, the large variation that we see in actual costs per life saved, which
varies by a factor of thousands or millions, could not be justified or
explained in any of the studies.
Gregory and Lichtenstein 1 7  sought to determine which
respondents would sacrifice lives for psychometric risk attributes,
without trying to determine the accepted variation in cost per life
saved. The results were mixed. Most respondents were willing to make
some tradeoff, but a large group refused to make any tradeoff at all.
Hypothesis and Research Question
Thus, lay respondents have been found to accept or support a
variation in cost per life saved factor of two or three in at least three
well-conducted studies. However, the authors of this article feel that
additional insight into the issue of accepted variation in cost per life
12 Ian Savage, An Empirical Investigation into the Effect of Psychological
Perceptions on the Willingness-to-pay to Reduce Risk, 6 J. Risk & Uncert. 75
(1993).
13 See Paul Slovic et al., The Psychometric Study of Risk Perception, in Risk
Evaluation and Management, Contemporary Issues in Risk Analysis 3 (1986), for a
comprehensive discussion of psychometric risk attributes.
14 John M. Mendeloff, Robert M. Kaplan, Are Large Differences in "Lifesaving"
Costs Justified? A Psychometric Study of the Relative Value Placed on Preventing
Death, 9 RiskAnal. 349 (1989).
15 Cropper, supra note 8.
16 This was the Cropper and Subramanian study; Mendeloff and Kaplan did not use
pairwise comparisons, but the intuition is the same.
17 Robin Gregory & Sarah Lichtenstein, A Hint of Risk-Tradeoffs Between
Quantitative and Qualitative Risk-Factors, 14 RiskAnal. 199 (1994).
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saved could be gained by incorporating the following three aspects into
the context for evaluation:
1. We wanted respondents to evaluate a fairly large number of
diverse programs; it might increase the degree of accepted variation.
2. We did not want respondents to choose between programs; this
focuses on tradeoffs made when choosing one program over another.
Consequently, in this setting, cost-effectiveness becomes very salient. In
many instances people do not consciously choose between programs;
more likely, they evaluate programs one at a time.1 8 Further, when
people form a preference or an attitude about a government program,
they are frequently have information about neither the program's cost
nor its cost-effectiveness. As a result, people often evaluate programs
without important information.
3. We wanted to use the respondent's own primitive beliefs
(perceptions) about cost, effectiveness and various qualitative attributes
of the programs rather than imposing these on the respondent.
Our motivation for these design choices flows from the fact that
any kind of preference-elicitation exercise is potentially sensitive to the
question framing, 19 i.e., how the question is stated will affect the
answer. Moreover, it is probable that preferences are formed by the
valuation process.
Regarding preferences elicited in contingent valuation studies, one
of the method's most vocal proponents, Hanemann, 2 0 has said that
the subject need not have held these preferences before the survey was
conducted. It is unnecessarily strict to require people to have well-
defined preferences, "utility functions engraved in their brain" 2 1 -
for perhaps previously unknown public goods. In fact, Hanemann goes
on to say that according to modern neuroscience and cognitive
psychology, people do not even have well-defined preferences for most
ordinary market goods. This is not necessarily a problem; most
empirical research is sensitive to the design of the instrument it uses and
18 Michael F. Drummond, et al., Methods for the Economic Evaluation of Health
Care Programs, Oxford Medical Publications (1997).
19 Baruch Fischhoff, Value Elicitation: Is There Anything There?, 46 Am. Psych.
835 (1991).
20 Michael W. Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through Contingent
Valuation, 8 J. Econ. Perspectives 19-(1994).
21 Id. at 23.
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it would be surprising if the same was not true for preference elicitation.
It does, however, raise the issue of how to frame the question correctly.
We hypothesized that respondents would accept a larger variation
with our format. However, if our hypothesis was correct, it would still
be an open question as to what format best describes underlying reality.
We do believe that our framing captures some features of how real life
preferences, or attitudes, might be formed and expressed. Yet, we
recognize that, normatively, our format is inferior; this is not a way to
elicit the public's well-considered preferences. In particular, a person's
incorrect assumptions or beliefs about a certain phenomena might affect
that person's actions. In such an instance, it is relevant to take the beliefs
as given in a descriptive study. However, for our purposes, we are
unaware of any reason to give beliefs moral or normative significance.
One problem with our approach is that it would be very hard to
ground it firmly in utility theory. Instead of assuming that respondents
have a utility function, we make the much weaker assumption that they
have an attitude function. Utility functions are constructed from
preferences, which always concern relations between objects. For
preferences to be represented by a utility function, a necessary (but not
sufficient) condition is that preferences are rational. Rational
preferences are defined as being complete and transitive. Attitudes, on
the other hand, can be directed towards single objects, which means
that we do not have to assume rationality of the respondents. In
particular, we do not have to assume transitivity, which has been a
problem in earlier studies of similar issues. The transitivity assumption
can, for example, be violated by framing effects, which often are
present in contingent valuation studies. For our purposes, the study of
attitudes seemed to be both feasible and sufficient to generate some
interesting insights into what might be influencing (or not influencing)
attitudes towards lifesaving.
Our particular interest in studying attitudes was to examine the
importance of cost and effectiveness, as predictors of attitudes.
The Present Study
A straightforward way of obtaining attitudes in a survey setting is to
ask the respondents to state the importance of an intervention.
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where b is the belief about an aspect of the object and e is the
importance weight of the aspect. A person might for example hold a
belief about the content of sugar in grams in a chocolate bar and attach
a certain importance to this sensation.2 2
Our additive attitude function lends itself easily to linear regression
analysis. The regression coefficients we later will obtain can be
interpreted as the importance weights e, from our model.
Our method is akin to the "headline-method" developed by
Kahneman and Ritov.2 3 An assumption behind our model was that
people can evaluate lifesaving interventions without being given
complete information about the intervention. This could be expressed
as an assumption that people have attitudes based on underlying
primitive beliefs about the lifesaving interventions. We presumed that
the subjects had ideas about various qualitative and quantitative
characteristics of the programs; we did not want to impose these upon
the respondent and, as discussed earlier, we did not want to make cost-
effectiveness a salient feature in the study.
Kahneman and Ritov justify the rudimentary amount of
information (they gave even less information than we did) given to
respondents by the hypothesis of process continuity. Errors and biases
that affect quick and intuitive judgments are also present in more
elaborate judgments.24
Apart from the cost and effect of the intervention, we wished to
include other qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the risks in
order to capture a large proportion of the variation in preferences for
lifesaving interventions. Since our survey would be lengthy even without
inclusion of risk characteristics, we chose to include only a small
number of such variables.
22 Martin Fishbein & Isac Ajzen, Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior: An
Introduction to Theory and Research (1975).
23 Daniel Kahneman & Ilsa Ritov, Determinants of Stated Willingness to Pay for
Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Method, 8-9 J. Risk & Uncert. 6 (1994).
24 Id.
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It is sometimes assumed that perceived level of risk is strongly
correlated with demand for risk mitigation. However, Sjdberg2 5
found that this is not necessarily true and that perceived consequences
were a better predictor.26 Therefore, we wished to include both
probability and consequences in our analysis, both personal and societal.
In addition we included variables representing individual control, and
annual fatalities. Individual control is often assumed to be important; it
also partly coincides with voluntariness. 2 7 Perceived annual fatalities
was needed to assess the importance of effectiveness. An interesting
finding by Fetherstonhaugh, et al.28 was that respondents to a survey
judged an intervention that saved the same number of lives more
beneficial when fewer lives were at risk. That is, to save, e.g., 10 lives out
of 100 at risk is more valuable than saving 10 lives out of 1000 at risk.
This can be interpreted to mean that the respondents were putting a
value on efficiency. This is a question we also were interested in. We
assumed that these variables, together with socioeconomic background
variables, would capture a large part of the variation in attitudes for
lifesaving interventions.
Method
Sample and Response Rate
In May 1996, a questionnaire was mailed to a Swedish sample (N =
250), age 18 or older. It was randomly drawn from a probability
sample of the Swedish population who had previously indicated
willingness to participate in one more survey. Respondents received a
lottery ticket worth SEK 25 (SEK 6.50 = USD 1) with the
questionnaire. By July 1996, 189 responses were obtained (75.6%).
Questionnaire
The questionnaire had been tested in advance on a small group of
subjects interviewed after responding to the questionnaire. Later, a
focus group was conducted, and a pilot survey was sent out to 50
25 Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280 (1987).
26 Lennart Sjaberg, Perceived Risk vs. Demand for Risk Reduction, J. Risk
Research (1997) in press.
27 Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. Risk & Uncert. 259 (1997).
28 David Fetherstonhaugh, et al., Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life: A
Study of Psychological Numbing, 14 J. Risk & Uncert. 283 (1997).
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people. Data from the pilot study are not included in these analyses.
Table 1




Dietary habits Prostate cancer
Sun bathing Radiology




Fire in health care institution Narcotics
The questionnaire was 37 pages in A4 format; 22 questions called
for a total of 251 responses. Besides background data, respondents were
asked for judgments concerning:
* personal and general probabilities and consequences of the
20 risks presented in Table 1.
* the annual fatalities in Sweden caused by those risks.
the degree of personal control over those risks.
* 24 different lifesaving interventions regarding:
- how desirable they are,
- how many lives would be saved by them, and
- their relative costs.
Results
Background Data
The background data show rather good agreement between the
respondents and the general population in Sweden. However, compared
to the national average, there were too many highly educated, too few
unemployed and too many above-average income respondents. These
differences call for caution when generalizing the findings from the
study. However, they are not serious enough to question the whole
study, especially since background data typically explain only a very
small part of the variation in preferences for lifesaving interventions. 2 9
Perceived Risks
We do not present the perceived risks as these are not of central
interest to our study. As a result, we will use them only as explanatory
29 Lennart Sj~berg, Demand For Risk Reduction, Meeting Organized by Society
for Risk Analysis - Europe: Risk in a Modem Society. Lessons from Europe (1996).
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variables. Moreover, the overall pattern they display, that people tend to
rate personal risk as lower than general risk, is a result that has been
replicated numerous times.30 This tendency has been called optimist
bias. 3 1 Now, risk has two components; the probability of a negative
event and the consequences of the negative event. In the present
questionnaire, we made an attempt to separate the probability and the
consequence of a negative event and we found, as expected, that for
most risks people rated both the probability and the severity of the
consequences as larger for the general public than for themselves.
Annual Fatalities
In an open-ended question, the respondents were asked to assess the
annual number of fatalities from the different risks. The overall pattern
is that the subject's estimates of annual fatalities was reasonably realistic,
apart from the tendency to overestimate small risks and underestimate
large risks.
The Interventions
In the next section of the questionnaire, the 24 lifesaving
interventions listed in Table 2 were evaluated by respondents. In the
questionnaire, the risk addressed by the intervention was also briefly
described.Table 2
The 24 Lifesaving Interventions Evaluated
1. Vaccination against influenza for the whole population in Sweden. Influenza
vaccination
2. A special education program on suicide prevention for general practitioners.
Suicide prevention.
3. Medical treatment for high levels of cholesterol. Cholesterol treatment
4. Information campaign against malignant melanoma. Melanoma campaign
5. Information campaign regarding indoor radon. Radon information
6. Start enough treatment centers to give all alcoholics who wish adequate care.
Alcohol treatment
7. Concrete barriers between sections of all divided highways. Barriers
8. Double the resources for the police to control drunken driving. Drunken driving
9. An 18 years age limit on smoking combined with information campaigns against
smoking among children and the young. Age limit on smoking
10. Preventive fire protection in all health care institutions. Fire protection
Continued
30 Lennart Sjiberg, Determinants and Consequences of Perceived Risk, Meeting
Organized by Society for Risk Analysis-Europe: Risk in a Modern Society: Lessons
from Europe (1996).
31 Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Bias About Personal Risks, 246 Science 1232
(1989).
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11. Protective measures against electromagnetic fields in the work place for groups
exposed to strong electromagnetic fields. Work-EMFS
12. Move all day-care centers that are exposed to electromagnetic fields from power
lines. Child-EMPS
13. Mandatory child-proof lids on all wells. Lids
14. A special 'security package" to all women who are threatened by severe domestic
violence. In some cases a life guard or a specially trained dog may be considered.
Security packages
15. Use coal-fiber cassettes in radiotherapy, whenever possible. Coal-fiber cassettes
16. Mass detection program for prostate cancer for men aged 50 and over. Prostate
cancer screening
17. Virus-decontamination of all donated blood to protect patients against, e.g.,
AIDS. Virus-decontamination
18. Reconstruct 50% of all train tunnels to facilitate evacuation and increase
accessibility for the rescue forces in case of a fire. Tunnels
19. Start enough treatment centers to give all drug addicts who wish adequate care.
Narcotics treatment
20. Require all new lamp posts that are erected along the roads to have a "slip-base".
Lamp posts
21. An annual quit-and-win contest for smokers combined with a large information
campaign against smoking. Quit-and-win
22. Reduce car exhausts by 50% through tighter standards. Reduce car
exhausts
23. Double the resources for research on, and testing of, food additives to detect
carcinogenic substances. Food additives testing
24. Information campaign about lightning and subsidize lightning conductors.
Lightning prevention
Importance of the Intervention
First, the importance of interventions was rated on a scale from 0 to
6 (should definitely not be to definitely should be implemented).
Respondents were told that these were to be implemented by local or
national governments. Results are in Table 3.
Cost
The cost of the interventions was the single most interesting
explanatory variable for our purposes. The alternatives at hand for
dealing with the cost of interventions seem to either present a cost for
each intervention or to let the respondent assess the cost of the
intervention. The main problem with the first approach is that the
subject's attitude towards the intervention could be influenced by his
perception of the total cost, a factor that would be lost if a cost is given.
Also, it is possible that the respondents would not believe any cost
factor that is portrayed as true.
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Table 3














Reduce car exhausts 4.13
Quit-and-win 4.05










The second approach captures respondents perception of cost. The
major disadvantage is of course that it may be hard to construct a
question that can be understood and answered by the subjects. In an
attempt to solve this problem, we have used a pair-wise comparison
format for determining the perceived relative costs of the interventions.
The respondents are presented with several pairs of interventions to
evaluate with respect to cost. If there is a large number of stimuli to
evaluate, people are in general not capable of giving adequate reports of
the perceived difference in their strength. To circumvent this problem,
stimuli can be presented in pairs. This procedure was originally
9 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 271 [Summer 1998]
developed for physical stimuli, such as the intensity of light, but it has
also been used to measure social phenomena.
There are several scaling methods that assume that the subject can
give valid reports of ratios between subjective magnitudes. 3 2 The
instructions usually require the subject to report one or two numbers
that reflect the ratio between two subjective magnitudes. In our
application, the respondent is asked, in each pair, to choose the
intervention which they believe is the most expensive. That intervention
is given the number one hundred. The respondent is then asked to
assign the other intervention a number between zero and one hundred
that reflects the relative cost of that intervention as compared to the
more expensive one. This is repeated for a number of pairs. Ideally, all
possible pairs should be evaluated by all respondents, but that would be
too strenuous on the respondents (since the number of pairs would be
quite large). Fortunately, it is not necessary to evaluate all pairs in order
to construct the whole matrix of magnitudes; the diagonal is sufficient.
It is assumed that the subject's response is a correct estimate of the
ratio between the subjective magnitudes. This assumption was called
the ratio assumption in Sjbberg. 33 Furthermore, it is assumed that
each stimuli gives rise to one, and only one, subjective magnitude
regardless of what other stimuli it is compared with. This assumption is
called the invariance assumption. 34
The ratio assumption is mostly technical; if a subject reports that he
thinks one object is, for example, twice as heavy as another, we can see
no compelling reason to believe that he really thinks otherwise. It does
not matter what the actual weight is, the assumption concerns the
subjective magnitudes. The invariance assumption is a bit stronger. The
subjective magnitude of how sweet a chocolate bar is could possibly be
different if the chocolate is compared to a lemon instead of honey.
However, because we asked the subjects to compare costs, the
invariance assumption seems reasonable. In particular; if a subject thinks
a chocolate bar costs one dollar, that should not change when it is
compared to a jar of honey instead of a lemon.
32 Lennart Sjoberg, Three Models for the Analysis of Subjective Ratios, 12
ScandinaianJ. Psy . 217 (1971).
33 Id.
34 Id.
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Let wij be the reported ratio between two subjective magnitudes.
Our model then assumes that
(1) wj= R / RJ
where Ri and R are subjective magnitudes corresponding to stimuli i
and j. In general, it can not be assumed that the report is error-free and
thus, an error term will be needed in practical applications. This model
implies that:
(2) wijjk = wk
From equation (1) it can be seen that
(3) log wij = log Ri - log RJ
When the model is expressed in linear form, as here, it is possible to use
linear regression procedures to estimate the parameters. We need to
give the solution entirely in terms of the observed w'jk, and to do this it
is necessary to specify a unit of measurement. If log R1 + log R2 +... +
log Rn is set to 1, the system of equations can be described as
log (R2/R1) = log R2 - log R1
log (R3/R1) = log R3 - log R1
log (Ri/Rj) = log Ri - log Rj
log (Rn-l/Rn) = log R4 - log Rn
log (0) = log R1 + log R2 +... + log Rn
In matrix form the model can be expressed:
(4) AR=w+
where the matrix A defines the right-hand side equations to be
determined and all its entries are -1, 0 or +1. For n = 5 this identity
matrix would, as an example, be:
-1 1 0 0 0
-1 0 1 0 0
0 -1 1 0 0
0 -1 0 1 0
0 0 -1 1 0
0 0 -1 0 1
0 0 0 -1 1
1 1 1 1 1
The vector R has the entries (R1 , R2 ,...,Rn). The vector w contains
the log ratios and e the errors. The standard least squares estimate of R
is:
(5) r = (A'A)-IA'w.
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The required inverse exists because of the prior specification of a
unit. The estimated scale values (R'i) themselves are given by the
antilogarithms of log R'i. The estimated scale values do not contain any
cardinal information about actual interventions cost. Scale values reflect
the respondent's perceived relative cost of the interventions and the
means of these are presented in Table 4, where the cost of the least
expensive intervention has been normalized to 1.
Table 4
Mean Estimated Relative Cost and Lives Saved for the 24 Interventions
Intervention Mean cost Mean number
of lives saved
Tunnels 47.32 59
Narcotics treatment 32.76 419
Alcohol treatment 22.93 616
Barriers 19.93 136
Child-EMF 11.39 86
Influenza vaccination 8.22 733
Reduce car exhausts 7.54 237
Drunken driving 6.44 213
Prostate cancer screening 5.05 370
Lamp posts 4.41 112
Food additives testing 3.49 285
Work-EMF 2.98 76
Fire protection 2.95 54
Virus-decontamination 2.78 175
Cholesterol treatment 2.58 1,737
Security packages 2.07 91
Suicide prevention 1.93 240
Quit-and-win 1.85 508
Coal-fiber cassettes 1.83 52
Lids 1.58 22
Lightning prevention 1.56 15
Age limit on smoking 1.46 1,394
Melanoma campaign 1.15 199
Radon information 1.00 186
Quite a large number of responses were missing from the data. If
more than 20% of the responses, i.e., more than nine pairs, were
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missing from a case, it was deleted. If less than nine pairs were missing
the values of the missing entries were calculated using the relationship in
equation (2). In all, 38 cases were deleted and 36 calculated ratios were
entered.
Note that the variation is about 1:50, a rather large number. The
present design maximizes the chances of measuring a large range in
perceived cost.
The Number ofLives Saved
In an open ended question, the respondents were asked to estimate
the annual number of lives saved by the interventions. The result is
presented in Table 4, together with the estimated costs.
Analyses
Accepted Variation in Cost Per Life Saved
To examine the variation in cost per life saved that was implicitly
accepted by the respondents, the ratio of the highest and lowest cost
per life saved was calculated for all interventions that had a rating of
five or six on the importance scale. This is a conservative estimate of the
accepted variation in cost per life saved, because a value of three
indicated that the interventions probably should be implemented and a
six indicated that the intervention should definitely be implemented.
The cost per life saved was computed as the relative cost of the
intervention divided by the number of lives saved. Note again that the
number in itself did not contain any cardinal information about the
subjects' beliefs about the real costs. The median variation factor was
97. This reveals that 50% of the respondents would accept that the
most expensive intervention costs 97 times as much as the least
expensive. The percentiles are presented in Table 5.
Table 5
Factor of Variation in Accepted (rated 5 or 6 on 0 -6 scale) Variation in Cost
per Life Saved for the 5, 10, 25, 50, 75, 90 and 95 Percentiles of Respondents
Percentile 5 10 25 50 75 90 95
Variation Factor 6 10 21 97 341 1,324 2,270
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The distribution shows an interesting skewness (5,58). There seems
to be a group of respondents who put very little weight on the cost-
effectiveness of the interventions. About 10% of the respondents accept
what must be called an extremely large variation in cost per life saved.
This observation was also made by Gregory and Lichtenstein 3 5 and
was further confirmed by Cropper and Subramanian. 36 It becomes
even more clear in the extreme values, which are presented in Table 6.
To let the cost per life saved vary with a factor 97, like the median, may
also seem like a very large variation, but compared to the actual
variation in cost-effectiveness of lifesaving interventions, it is in fact not.
We want to apply extreme caution in interpreting these results. A
variation with a factor 97 can mean, for example, that the least
expensive intervention is perceived to cost $1 million per life saved and
the most expensive $97 million per life saved, a difference of $96
million. But it could also mean that the least expensive intervention is
perceived to cost $1,000 per life saved and the most expensive $97,000
per life saved, a difference of only $96,000. We have no ground
whatsoever to speculate on what kind of absolute values the subjects had
in mind when answering the questions, because there is no baseline in
our cost-question. However, the same is true for the Mendeloff and
Kaplan, and Cropper and Subramanian studies.
Table 6
Factor of Variation in Accepted (rated 5 or 6 on 0 -6 scale) Cost per Life Saved






The Importance of the Attributes
A number of analyses were carried out to examine the importance
of cost, effectiveness, the qualitative attributes and background variables
35 Gregory, supra note 17.
36 Cropper, supra note 8.
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for the rated importance of the interventions. All regressions were run
with Importance of intervention as the independent variable.
Linear Regressions on the Individual Data
We analyzed the individual data, first by means of linear and then
of logistic regression. The highest adjusted R2 we could achieve was
0.27, which was obtained for a regression on the importance of the
intervention Lightning prevention, with outliers eliminated. 37 In most
of the 24 regressions, the adjusted R2 was typically in the range 0.05-
0.15. This is not satisfying because it means that one or more important
explanatory variables were not included in the model and these
omissions affect the power of the significance tests to an unknown
extent. At the same time it is not surprising; regressions on individual
data frequently generate low values of R2 .
Regarding the individual independent variables, we note several
results. Background variables like age, sex, income and place of
residency did not explain much variation, as expected, although age
and sex were significant in several regressions. For the variables cost,
severity of the consequences for people in general, effectiveness of the
intervention, and individual control, the number of regressions, out of
the total 24, in which the variable was significant at 1, 5 and 10% are
presented in Table 7. Generally, we found low values for all the
independent variables. Sometimes, coefficients had an unexpected sign.
Severity of the consequences for people in general, as opposed to
personal consequences, was the strongest explanatory variable. The
variable was significant at the 5% level in 12 of 24 regressions. This is in
accordance with earlier findings. Effectiveness of the intervention had
some importance and was significant at the 5% level in 6 regressions,
but generally had low values. Cost was insignificant in most regressions
and had low values, sometimes with the wrong sign. This supports our
hypothesis that cost is not a strong determinant of people's attitudes
towards lifesaving interventions. Individual control also turned out to
be insignificant in most regressions.
37 An even higher adjusted R2 of .42 was achieved when we ran the regression on the
aggregated data, i.e. the means, instead. This was expected because some of the errors
cancel each other in the means. The adjusted R2 is better than what was reported by
Mendeloff and Kaplan, supra note 14, which is the only comparable study. They
found an adjusted R2 around .30. However, we do not believe this is the best way of
using the data. Instead, regressions should be run on the individual observations.
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Table 7
Number of Regressions out of 24, in Which the Variable Was
Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 % Levels
Independent variable
Cost Significant at 5% in 1 regression
Significant at 10% in 1 regression
Effectiveness Significant at 1% in 2 regressions
Significant at 5% in 4 regressions
Significant at 10% in 1 regression
Consequence for Significant at 1% in 8 regressions
people in general Significant at 5% in 4 regressions
Significant at 10% in 2 regressions
Control Significant at 1% in 1 regression
Significant at 5% in 1 regression
Significant at 10% in 1 regression
We note that different explanatory variables were significant in
different regressions. The explanation for this is that our approach
analyses why different people judge one and the same intervention
differently; it is not surprising that a single model fails to explain
individual differences in attitudes towards all 24 interventions. It is, for
example, conceivable that men would think that an intervention against
prostate cancer is more important than women do, but we do not
expect a gender difference in attitude towards, for example, an indoor-
radon intervention.
Logistic regression
The dependent variable, importance of the intervention, was
treated as a continuous variable in the linear regressions. However, the
variable was not actually continuous, as it was constructed as a scale
with seven steps. It has been argued that seven steps is enough to permit
this assumption of continuity.3 8 Even so, a minimal precaution is to
test if the results change if a logistic regression is performed. To that
end, importance of the intervention was transformed to a binary
variable, which corresponds to a referendum format, where 0 represents
38 Eli P. Cox III, The Optimal Number of Response Alternatives For a Scale: A
Review, 17J. Market. Research 407 (1980).
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that the intervention should not and 1 that intervention should be
implemented. The logistic regression on this variable overall showed
similar results, except that effectiveness had very high odds in some
regressions. Cost did not prove to be more significant or explain more
of the variation in this format.
Conclusions
The median respondent implicitly accepted that the cost per life
saved varied by a factor of 97. This is considerably more than shown in
other studies and is almost certainly an effect of the chosen format for
assessing accepted variation - intended as a more realistic portrayal of
attitude formation rather than as a normative guide.
The general conclusions of the analyses of the effect of our
explanatory variables on the attitudes are that Cost did not have a
strong influence on the rated importance of a lifesaving intervention
and was most often not significant. Effectiveness of the intervention
and consequences for people in general were the most significant and
strongest explanatory variables.
To speculate a bit, nothing in our study rejects the explanation that
costs per life saved vary because decision makers are influenced by the
attitudes of the general public and that the general public does not
place much weight on cost or cost-effectiveness, with the implication
that it implicitly would accept huge variations in cost per life saved. In
some earlier studies public preferences have been recognized to play a
fundamental role in political decision making on risk mitigation.
3 9
Governments, at least in the U.S., have even been found to be
predominantly reactive rather than proactive with respect to risk
mitigation. With the words of Shubik: "Once a large enough political
constituency appears to be actively upset... the politicians may react.
Once the politicians have reacted sufficiently, the bureaucracy may
respond. '' 4 0 Sjiberg found that local politicians in Sweden had
attitudes to risk very similar to the general public's, and their demand
39 Martin Shubik, Risk, Society, Politicians, Scientists and People, Risk,
Organizations and Society (1991); Jan A. Stolwijk & P. F. Canny, Determinants of
Public Participation in Management of Technological Risk, Risk, Organization and
Society 33 (1991); Anthony Barker, Expert Advice and Formal Public Involvement
on Public Policies Involving Risk, Organizations, Uncertainties and Risk 207 (1992).
40 Shubik, supra note 39, at 10.
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for risk reduction was strongly influenced by their perception of the
public's demand for risk reduction.4 1
Overall, the results are somewhat disappointing. We were unable to
explain the variation in preferences over lifesaving intervention.
However, previous researchers have also had only limited success.
We would like to point out that our format for assessing the
perceived cost of the intervention allows a large variation in the costs.
This has not previously been done and is a methodological contribution
that could be of some use. It would however be more useful if a
meaningful base level could be established, such as expressing one of the
costs in dollars, and the rest in relation to this value.
Limitations
We do not know the extent to which attitudes we obtained are
actually expressed in public or private. The relevant attitudes to study
would of course be those expressed because only those conceivably
affect policy making. Attitudes expressed in public or private should be
contrasted with attitudes or preferences revealed from actual decisions.
It does not even have to be held internally.42 At any rate, we do not
know the connection between attitudes and decision making, which
clearly limits our ability to draw firm conclusions.
Also, our survey was already too extensive to include all relevant
variables. We would probably have been able to explain a larger
proportion of the variation in rated importance of the interventions if
we had also included the following variables which were found to be
significant by Cropper and Subramanian:43 fairness of the funding
mechanism, appropriateness of government intervention,4 4 and time
lag before lives are saved. More investigation of these variables is
recommended.
41 Lennart Sjoberg, Risk Perception by Politicians and the Public, Risk Research
Report No. 26 (1996).
42 See Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies (1995), on preference falsification.
43 Cropper, supra note 8.
44 Although a recent survey in Sweden, see supra note 41, found hardly any area in
which the respondents did not want more government intervention.
